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Two conceptions, variously modified, lie at the basis of psy-
chology. It may be treated after the fashion of Hoffding and
Brentano, of Stout, Royce and Baldwin, as a study of the ac-
tivities or the relations of conscious selves; or else, as by Miin-
sterberg, by Titchener and for the most part by Kiilpe, psy-
chology may be regarded as a study of contents-of-conscious-
ness, of percepts, images, feelings and the like, considered with-
out explicit reference to the selves for which they exist. One
of the most serious errors of the psychological theorist is the
conviction that one of these methods must be ' right' to the ex-
clusion of the other. On the contrary, both are valid and use-
ful though they are entirely distinct. The psychology of selves
in their relations is a genuine science, lying at the basis of his-
tory, ethics and philosophy, whereas the psychology of the con-
tents-of-consciousness facilitates a close and helpful parallel of
psychic facts with physical and physiological phenomena.
Equally misleading and far more frequent are the confusion
of these methods and the alternations from one to another within
the limits of one system. Wundt, for instance, adds to his an-
alysis of Vorstettungen an uncoordinated doctrine of ' inner
activity ' ; Kiilpe treats psychology, through four hundred pages,
as a study of elements and their synthesis, and then suddenly
swings over to the other point of view and considers conscious-
ness-as-a-whole and attention as its state or condition {Zustand);
and James oscillates without explanation between the two
methods of regarding consciousness, now as a ' stream' of
thoughts or a succession of ' feelings,' and again as a set of ' cog-
nitive functions ' or ' operations.' The ordinary division of the
spoils between these methods of psychology allots to the study of
1
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psychic contents the analytic treatment of percepts, of images
and sometimes of emotions, but reserves for the other method
the treatment of memory, of thought and of will. The truth
is, however, that this confusion of two governing conceptions
within one system is as unnecessary as it is misleading. Per-
ception, as truly as will, may be treated as a form of self-con-
sciousness ; and, on the other hand, thoughts like images may
be made to disclose their elements. In other words, every con-
scious experience may be studied from either point of view.
The purpose of the present paper is, however, the consistent
treatment of all psychological material from only one of these
standpoints; the demonstration that every conscious experi-
ence may be treated as a content-of-consciousness and analyzed
into its constituent elements. The immediate problem is the
enumeration and the grouping of these elements.
The basis of the classification which follows is the rigorous
conception of a psychic element as a distinct and absolutely ir-
reducible part of a conscious content. This definition has been
already outlined by the writer in a discussion of one of its corol-
laries ; the impossibility that a sensation, if defined as element,
should have attributes.1 The present paper may therefore enter at
once upon the consideration of certain objections to the theory
which it upholds. The first of these sets forth that the term 'un-
analyzable' has only relative value as applied to the content-of-
consciousness. Experimental methods and careful introspection,
it is stated, are constantly showing that experiences which seemed
absolutely simple at the outset, are really further analyzable, as
when, for instance, the supposed ' sensation' of humidity is found
to be a mixture of tactual and temperature experience. The ar-
gument may be met, however, by showing that the admitted rela-
tivity and uncertainty, in the case of any given analysis, do not
affect the logical accuracy of the conception of ' psychic ele-
ment ' nor alter its methodological value as a limiting concept.
Indeed, every supposed psychic element might be shown to be
decomposable, without disproving the conceivability of the ele-
ment as such.
The second objection lays stress upon the artificiality and
•PSYCHOUJGICAI, REVIEW, VI., 506, September, 1899.
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the abstractness of the psychic element. It urges that the
simple and undiscriminated content-of-consciousness is always
first in actual experience, that the analysis of it is always a later,
reflective process and that the fact-as-analyzed is radically dif-
ferent from that earlier undiscriminated content. All this, again,
is freely granted. The element of consciousness is indeed only
a distinguishable, not a concretely separable experience; the
psychic fact is primarily unanalyzed; and analysis is a reflec-
tive, and not an immediate, procedure, never to be taken after
the associationist fashion, as an account of the way in which
contents of consciousness have been actually built up out of
separate elements. Yet psychological analysis, through at-
tention to the remembered parts of a psychic complex, though
it is neither a primitive nor a universal experience, is neverthe-
less a necessary, scientific method and is employed by all psy-
chologists to one degree or another. Consistency demands
therefore that the analysis be carried out as far as possible; and
the irreducible element is really no more radically unlike the
concrete experience than the mixture of quality, intensity and
extent which ordinarily goes by the name ' sensation.' More-
over, this complete analysis has practical value as well as theo-
retical necessity, for it stimulates close introspection and fur-
nishes, as will be shown, a basis for the correlation of psychic
with physical phenomena.
Quite opposed to this objection to the undue simplicity of
our psychic element is the teaching of Professor Miinsterberg's
recent paper1 that the ' really indivisible elements of mental
facts' are not sensations nor in fact any observable phenomena
of consciousness, but rather absolutely dissimilar physic atoms,
which " no psychologist will ever observe in his own conscious-
ness," since they are • merely constructions for the purpose of
explanation.' An adequate discussion of Miinsterberg's argu-
ment would fall without the limits of this paper. Yet even if
the psychic element—a seeming paradox—is an unobservable
atom and therefore not an object of consciousness, it is never-
theless of advantage to consider what are the simplest phe-
nomena of consciousness.
1
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Assuming then that attentive introspection may discover ele-
ments of consciousness, we may next seek to formulate anew
their distinguishing characteristics. The fundamental criterion
of the element of consciousness is certainly this : its persistent
distinctness from other elements and its unassailable simplicity.
The element of consciousness is therefore the experience which
regulated, repeated and verified introspection fails to analyze fur-
ther or to identify with some other. This indeed is the only stand-
ard by which to estimate the element. The other criteria which
we shall consider are clearly supplementary; they merely sub-
stantiate our introspective distinctions and assist us in classifying
the elements which introspection has already disclosed. Our
question, therefore, in its simplest form, is this: What sorts of
elements do we actually distinguish?
I.
The group of psychic elements which we may first consider
is the one admitted by all psychologists, the class of the sensa-
tional elements. ' Blue ' and ' sour' and ' warm' and the rest,
are unanalyzable yet distinguishable features of my experience
and seem also entirely different from other elements, as for
instance pleasantness. But besides this indispensable criterion
of the elements—the observed distinctness and unanalyzable-
ness—there are certain observable characteristics marking off
the sensational elements from others. The first of these is the
existence of a probable physical correlate for each sensational
element. Thus, the rate of ether vibrations is the physical
condition of each color; the amplitude of the vibrations is the
condition of each brightness or color-intensity, the rate of
atmosphere vibrations is the condition of each pitch, and so on
with more or less exactness of nomenclature according to the
degree of advance in the physical sciences. Sensational ele-
ments may further be distinguished from all others by the fact
of their readily assignable physiological conditions and by the
peripheral as well as central nature of these excitations. These
marks of the sensational element are indeed so universally ad-
mitted that they do not demand detailed comment.
Reflective observation however discloses a final important
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criterion. Sensational elements are present in every concrete
experience, even when they are not predominant within it; and
a given content-of-consciousness may conceivably consist en-
tirely of sensations without the admixture of any other elements.
A percept for instance need include no affective elements; it
may be perfectly indifferent. It is this ability to stand alone,
as it were, in consciousness which justifies the epithet ' substan-
tive ' as applied by James to sensations.
Within the class of sensational elements, thus marked off
from others, psychological method distinguishes—under one
name or another—qualities and intensities. (Extensities should
be ranged under the head of qualities—if indeed they are not
held to be complexes, including always motor or tactual experi-
ences.) The question of the method of differentiating from
each other these different sorts of sensational elements—the
qualities and the intensities—is not altogether easy. There are
of course the very clear physical and physiological distinctions.
Extent of physical vibration and place of excitation condition
the sensational quality, whereas amplitude of vibration and
degree (with locality) of physiological excitation are the accom-
paniment of the sensational intensity. But another feature, a
reflectively observed characteristic, distinguishes intensity from
quality, by contrasting them in virtue of their possible serial
arrangement.1 Aside from what may be called the complex
series in which sensational qualities may figure (color series
like ' red, orange, yellow, yellow-green' or tone-series like
C-CE-EG, in which the likeness of the successive terms is due
to the presence of identical elements), sensational qualities are
also capable of simple serial arrangement. Such series as ' red,
yellow, green, blue,' or C-D-E-F are illustrations. Now the
serial character of this succession is due to an increase not of
the quality but of the difference. In other words the conscious-
ness of ' more' which characterizes every step of a series
attaches itself not directly to each quality but to the recognized
likeness or difference of each quality as compared with its
neighbors. Fully expressed, such a tone-series is not therefore
C-D-E-F-G, nor yet:
JThe theory of the series underlying the distinctions which follow will be
recognized as that of William James. Cf. Principles, I., 489 seq. ; 530 seg.
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C
D = more C
E =rmore D
still more C
but rather,
C —
D —different from C
E — different from D
more different from C
F — different from E
more different from D
still more different from C
Intensities, on the other hand, are capable of direct serial
arrangement. The increase is of the intensity, as it were, that
is, the ' feeling of more' as James calls it, is directly connected
with the consciousness of ' bright' or of ' loud' and our series
becomes ' bright—more bright—still more bright,' or ' loud—
more loud—still more loud,' and so on.
In all these ways, and fundamentally always by their imme-
diately observed distinctness, the sensational elements are dis-
tinguished from the others, and within this group the qualities
are contrasted with the intensities.
II.
The second group of elements of consciousness includes as
its most undisputed subdivision the affections of pleasantness and
unpleasantness, admitted by almost every one as elemental and
distinct from sensations. Besides possessing the ultimate cri-
terion of observed simplicity and distinctness, these are differen-
tiated from sensations in that, in their case, there is no assignable
physical stimulus—no definite form of physical energy which is
the invariable accompaniment of pleasure or of unpleasantness;
and because there is in all likelihood no distinct bodily organ by
whose functioning each is conditioned. Theories of the physi-
ological basis of the affections do indeed differ widely, but
whether one hold with Titchenerl that they are explained by
bodily anabolism and catabolism, or with Marshall2 that they are
due to the pressure or absence of ' stored-up energy ' in any one
1
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organ, or with Miinsterberg1 that pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness are ' values of a sensation parallel to the local situation of
the discharge' of centrifugal or outgoing cortical energy—on
any one of these theories it is evident that there is no definite
'organ'of pleasantness or of unpleasantness, in the sense in
which the retina is the organ of color and the taste bulbs organs
of taste; so that the physiological correlate of affections is a
general condition independent of any particular organ.
In two important particulars of another sort, affections are
distinguished from sensational elements. They are not always
present and they are never conceivably alone in consciousness.
One's perceptual or reflective experience may be utterly indiffer-
ent and devoid of affective coloring; and one can not imagine
bare pleasantness or unpleasantness ; there is always an agree-
able or a disagreeable somewhat—a pleasant familiarity, or an
unpleasant sound. Sensations, on the other hand, as we have
seen, may conceivably occur without other elements in an in-
different and unrelated complexity. To mark these distinctions,
affections may be called ' attributive' after the fashion in which
sensations have been characterized as ' substantive.'
To the class of attributive elements, thus distinguished by
the absence of physical stimulation, by the ' general' character
of their physiological excitation and by their intermittent and
coincident occurrence, other elements than the affections may
be referred. The so-called ' feeling' of realness and the cona-
tion or «feeling of effort,' if admitted at all as psychic elements,
will be. classed in this group. But the simplicity of each of
these experiences is challenged by many observers. The al-
leged conation is treated as an anticipatory image, and the feel-
ing of realness is held to be identical with the consciousness of
congruity. Our purpose, however, is attained when we have
assigned to these alleged contents of consciousness a purely
hypothetical place among attributive elements, and we need not
undertake to consider the mooted questions of their elementary
character.
We shall omit discussion of still another problem, the possi-
ble distinction, within this class, between qualities and intensi-
1
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ties. Two theories are at least formally possible. The oppo-
sition between quality and intensity can, perhaps, be made only
in the case of sensations ; yet it is, perhaps, observable in every
group of conscious elements. If this last be true, as certain ex-
periences suggest, then pleasure-intensities must, of course, be
distinguished from pleasure-qualities. Introspection, however,
is at this point so difficult that the limits of our discussion pre-
clude consideration of the question.
III.
With its next step, this classification departs definitely from
the beaten track of psychological system. Yet the doctrine that
the analysis of contents-of-consciousness is still incomplete,
when substantive and attributive elements have been distin-
guished, lays claim to the unequivocal support of careful in-
trospection. In the experience, for instance, of matching some
one color with another, the blueness, the grayness and the
brightness are not the only elements involved. On the con-
trary, the consciousness of the likeness or difference of the
given blue to certain others is the very essence of the ' match-
ing' consciousness.1 Similarly, it is evident that a recognition
is not exhaustively analyzed when one has enumerated all the
sensations included in the immediate percept and the associated
images, the organic sensations accompanying the bodily attitude
and the pleasantness oi the experience.2 Neither any one of
these, nor the combination of them, is what we mean by the
' feeling of familiarity' which marks the memory-image and
the recognized percept. The experience of ' wholeness,'which
characterizes our judgments, and the ' feeling' of ' anyness' or
' generality,' which on any conceptualist theory, is the essential
feature of the general notion, are further illustrations of ex-
periences so radically different from sensations and affections
that they may neither be identified with them nor reduced to
them. As James declares,3 " we ought to say a feeling of
1
 Cf. H. Cornelius, Zeitschrift f. Psych, u. Phys., Bd. 22, no.
!Cf. Titchener, Outline of Psychology, § 70 seq.
3
 Principles of Psychology, I., 245, end. It is almost unnecessary to re-
mark that the -word ' feeling' as used in this connection by Mr. Jatnes and by
the writer, is a mat synonym for ' fact of consciousness' or • psychosis,' and
does not imply any admixture of affection.
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and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but and a feeling of by, quite
as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of co/^."
These elements of consciousness may be described, for a
reason which will later appear, as ' transitional.'1 The proof of
their existence is, as has been indicated, the introspective dis-
covery of actual experiences which simply are not analyzable
into substantive and attributive elements. We do have, for in-
stance, conscious contents corresponding with such words as
• different,' ' whole,' ' many,' ' more.' These certainly are
' affectively toned,' but the sense of pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness which they subtly convey does not exhaust their meaning.
The only sensational elements involved are those of the mere
word-as-perceived ; but the associationist contradicts the plain-
est results of introspection when he claims2 that the verbal
image is the distinguishing mark of such an experience. On
the contrary, we realize that if the affection and the sensational
verbal elements could be stripped away from such a conscious
content—if, for instance, the verbal image ' like ' and the char-
acteristic pleasure of discovering similarities could be dropped
out of the ' feeling of likeness'—its center and kernel would
remain untouched, as a somewhat which, in the words of
James, • feels different' from any sensation or any affection.
A comparison of this class with the others shows that, as in
the case of ' attributive' elements, there are here no physical
stimuli, no forms of physical energy corresponding with experi-
ences of ' oneness,' ' connection,' ' difference' and the like. But
the probable physiological conditions are different from those of
the affection, as of the sensation, for they are purely intra-
cortical. Not a definite brain-center connected with a peripheral
organ, not any general physiological condition of body-as-a-
whole or of any organ, and not even an outgoing cortical im-
pulse is the physiological explanation of the ' transitional' ele-
1
 James's epithet 'transitive' has not been employed, because its basis, the
duration of the physiological process, has seemed unessential and not entirely
certain. It has already been made evident that this classification departs at sev.
eral points from that of James. He assigns no definite place to what we have
called the ' attributive' elements, unless his ' substantive feelings' are meant to
Include them.
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ment, which is conditioned, rather, by some spread of cortical
energy, some excitation of transverse fibers within the brain.
There is still one other standpoint from which the • transi-
tional ' element may be compared with the others. Unlike the
sensation, but like the attributive element, it perhaps is not al-
ways present in a concrete content-of-consciousness. Far less
frequent than the ' indifferent' experience, yet still conceivable,
is the utterly undiscriminated experience, the conscious content
without observed unity, multiplicity, likeness, difference—in a
word, devoid of transitional elements. From attributive, as well
as from substantive, elements most transitional elements are ob-
viously distinguished by another characteristic : they require the
presence of at least two other elements. One cannot be con-
scious of likeness without observing the two objects which are
like, or of familiarity without being conscious of something pres-
ent and of something past. The only apparent exception is
the feeling of • oneness,' and of this it may be said that it cer-
tainly must have originated in connection with a consciousness
of ' plurality,' which evidently requires the presence of several
elements.
The attempt to enumerate these * transitional' elements dis-
closes serious difficulties of introspection. The experiences in
question have no physical conditions and are physiologically ex-
cited by central, without peripheral, change. It is therefore
alike impossible to isolate a stimulus, or to bring an element
into prominence by constant variation of its accompaniments.
Contents-of-consciousness which are ideally analyzable may
readily defy actual analysis and may be incorrectly treated as
elemental. Examples of these delusively simple experiences
are the feelings of ' wholeness' and of * familiarity,' already
named. Simple as they seem, they certainly are not strictly
elemental. The first named may be reduced to a consciousness
of one-as-connection-of-many and thus involves at least three
perfectly distinct elements, and the ' feeling of familiarity' is
even more complex, presupposing the consciousness of ' same-
ness' and of 'pastness,' each of which in turn
 tis still further
reducible.
Bearing in mind the admitted difficulty of introspective
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analysis, the following enumeration of transitional elements is
expressly offered as tentative and open to correction. The
' feelings' of ' one-ness' and of ' many-ness' or plurality are
fundamental elements of this class, that is, they lie at the basis
of most complexes. The ' feelings' of connection, of opposition,
of likeness, of difference, of ' more-ness' and of ' less-ness ' are
probably also transitional elements, but this list may not be
exhaustive and, on the other hand, it perhaps includes analyz-
able contents of consciousness. The ' feelings' of • wholeness,'
of ' necessary connection' and of * sameness ' are very simple
combinations of these elements, readily mistaken, as we have
seen, for unanalyzable experiences; and the ' feelings' of
' familiarity' and ' generality' or ' anyness ' are still more com-
plex contents-of-consciousness, but reducible to transitional
elements.
This doctrine of transitional elements must of course contend
against objections of two sorts. On the one hand, those who
regard psychology as a study of functions of the self will cry
out loudly against the peculiar sacrilege of reducing to mere
conscious elements, to-mind-stuff, as it were, the relating activ-
ities of Self or Mind. From the opposite camp, the upholders
of the theory of psychology as mere study of psychic contents
will come forth to do battle against a theory which, they say,
admits Kantian categories, under the guise of ' transitional
elements,' into the ranks of psychological facts.
To critics of the Intellectualist school the following reply
must be made: The objection, if urged only at this point of
our analysis, comes too late. If the right to analyze conscious
contents into sensations, or into sensations and affections, has
been admitted, as it practically always is, then consistency
requires a continuation of the analysis until it is recognized as
complete. It is unreasonable to say in effect: ** While you
are treating of perceptual and even of emotional experience, you
may regard consciousness as a succession of ideas and of feel-
ings and may analyze these into their elements, but when you
come upon a judgment or a memory and are conscious of other
than sensational and affective experience, you must change
your point of view and drop your conception of elements and
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talk only of the activities of Self or Mind." The method is
valid throughout or it is absolutely invalid. Either it is in-
correct, and not merely useless, to treat of percepts and emo-
tions as'1 combinations of sensational and affective elements, or
it is also necessary, if introspection discloses unanalyzable con-
tents like one-ness, connection and difference, to admit their
elemental character.
The other difficulty is met by denying its assumption. Our
transitional elements are not reflectively observed and classified
•categories,' they are experiences as immediate as the sensations
or the affections themselves. The proof of their actual exist-
ence is the failure of all attempts to reduce memories and
'thoughts' to merely sensational and affective elements.
A very simple classification of conscious complexes may be
based upon this distinction of psychic elements. Percepts and
images, complexes in which sensational elements predominate,
may be contrasted with feelings and emotions, complexes in
which affections are the essential feature; and both may be dis-
tinguished from those conscious complexes which are character-
ized by the presence of transitional elements, or by simple com-
binations of them. These are : the judgment, whose essential
feature is the ' feeling' of wholeness ; the general notion char-
acterized by the ' feeling' of generality or ' anyness ' ; and the
memory image, in which the • feeling' of familiarity is of para-
mount importance. All this is suggested by the following tabu-
lation which summarizes the most important conclusions of the
discussion:
A. ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
Criterion : Distinctness and Unanalyzableness.
I. ' Substantive' or Sensational Elements.
i (Psychological) Conceivable presence of elements of
another order.
Criteria \ t. (Physiological) Definite peripheral and central excita-
tion.
3-. (Physical) Definite form of physical stimulation.
a. Sensational ' qualities.' .
(i. Not directly accompanied by 'feeling' of 'more' or 'less.'
Criteria Va. Varying with locality of physiological excitation.
I3. Varying with rate of physical vibration.
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b. Sensational ' intensities.'
1 1. Directly accompanied by 'feeling' of ' more,' etc.2. Varying with degree (and with locality) of physio-logical excitation.3. Varying with amplitude of physical vibration.
II. 'Attributive'elements.
1 1. Not always present and not conceivably occurring2. Physiological excitation : ' General' bodily condition.3. No characteristic physical stimulaton.
a. Affections.
f b. ' Feeling of realne6s.'
?? c. Conation.
III. ' Transitional' elements.
Criteria
1. (a) Not always present and not conceivably occurring
alone.
(3) Requiring, each, the presence of at least two
other elements.
2. Physiological excitation : intra-cortical.
3. No characteristic physical stimulation.
B. COMPLEX CONTENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
I. ' Substantive'(Sensational) experience predominates: "f
II. ' Attributive' experience predominates.
a. Affections: Emotions, etc.
, , _ , . , . , , f The Belief
h. Feeling of realness : |
 T h e V o H t i o n
etc.
III. ' Transitional' experience predominates.
a. ' Feeling of wholeness': The Judgment
, ._ „ . . . . . /The Recognized
b. 'Feeling of familiarity': \ The Remembered
c. ' Feeling of generality ': The General Notion
